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ABSTRACT
Security products often create more problems than they
solve, drowning users in alerts without providing the con-
text required to remediate threats. This challenge is com-
pounded by a lack of experienced personnel and security
tools with complex interfaces. These interfaces require users
to become domain experts or rely on repetitive, time con-
suming tasks to turn this data deluge into actionable in-
telligence. In this paper we present Artemis, a conversa-
tional interface to endpoint detection and response (EDR)
event data. Artemis leverages dialog to drive the automa-
tion of complex tasks and reduce the need to learn a struc-
tured query language. Designed to empower inexperienced
and junior security workers to better understand their se-
curity environment, Artemis provides an intuitive platform
to ask questions of alert data as users are guided through
triage and hunt workflows. In this paper, we will discuss
our user-centric design methodology, feedback from user in-
terviews, and the design requirements generated upon com-
pletion of our study. We will also present core functionality,
findings from scenario-based testing, and future research for
the Artemis platform.
1. INTRODUCTION
Across industries organizations are faced with the growing
threat of computer network attacks. Threats such as data
theft, ransomware, and phishing have brought an influx of
security products designed to detect and respond to intru-
sions and anomalies on a network. However, for these plat-
forms to be employed successfully, organizations require a
workforce capable of not only having a subject matter exper-
tise in information security, but also a deep understanding
of the very platforms designed to augment their day-to-day
operations.
The construction of a viable security operations center (SOC)
has proven to be the one of the biggest issues in informa-
tion security.[1] The primary mission of a SOC is network
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defense. It is a difficult and demanding task requiring an-
alysts to manually search through a deluge of alert and log
data to identify anomalies. Experienced analysts rely on
both personal and organizational methodologies to: 1) for-
mulate a hypothesis; 2) gather supporting evidence and 3)
remediate a threat.
One of the key challenges in creating a SOC is the lack of
skilled professionals. Currently, the security industry faces a
workforce shortage with the demand of skilled professionals
far outpacing the pool of available applicants. Estimates of
this deficit range from 1-2 million workers by 2019.[2] Mul-
tiple factors contribute to the shortage, but two that stand
out are a lack of subject matter experience and a lack of ed-
ucational tools for potential workers. In SOC environments,
this is compounded by non-intuitive interfaces and complex
query languages found within products that force users to
be experts in both security and the platform itself. Cur-
rent approaches to tackle this problem focus on augmenting
analysts through standardized analytic processes, such as
collaboration and information sharing, and less on training
and educating inexperienced analysts. Assistive technolo-
gies, such as conversational interfaces, are rarely included
in security platforms and represent a missed opportunity to
develop expertise holistically.
In this paper, we present preliminary research from studying
diverse user groups within security organizations. We detail
the roles, behaviors, and workflows employed during day-to-
day operations we uncovered throughout the research pro-
cess. We highlight common challenges shared across security
teams such as alert fatigue, data deluge, and complex user
interfaces. From this study we present Artemis, a conversa-
tional interface to the Endgame Endpoint Detection and Re-
sponse platform. Artemis was developed in response to the
data collected during our study by employing a user-centered
design approach. The results of this research yielded invalu-
able insights we leveraged into development requirements for
our conversational interface that will be discussed in-depth
in the following sections. Finally, we share our findings from
testing the initial implementation of Artemis and provide
recommendations for future iterations.
1.1 Related Work
Previous research in augmenting the security workforce has
centered on collaboration through co-locating analyst en-
vironments with data sources[3], reducing alert fatigue[4],
and using simulations to improve training [5, 6]. Most of
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this research focuses on process, rather than tools designed
to empower analysts.
Conversational interfaces or dialog systems have been suc-
cessfully employed in a variety of domains. These intelligent
assistants can provide “best practice” guidance and recom-
mended paths to desired actions within an intuitive, natural
language interface. In [7] researchers applied NLP to provide
an interface enabling users to find and recognize previously
unknown, but useful information. This required domain ex-
pertise, thus making the identification of important, but
previously unknown, information significantly easier. Re-
searchers in [8, 9] discuss the benefits of personal digital as-
sistants (e.g. Cortana) to carry out Question-Answer tasks
via natural language queries against the web or knowledge
bases. In information security, domain researchers in [10]
introduce an intelligent assistant that leverages IBM Wat-
son natural language understanding software for analyzing
unstructured security data.
2. USER-CENTERED DESIGN
The User-Centered Design approach[11] focuses on three pri-
mary phases: 1) Discovery; 2) Concepting and 3) Prototyp-
ing and User Testing. We designed our Discovery phase to
better understand our target user base. By capturing team
dynamics and organizational workflows we came away better
equipped to generate product requirements. We began this
work early in the research and development process starting
with user interviews across a variety of use cases, including
red vs. blue teams, where attackers (red team) attempt to
infiltrate a computer network defended by a blue team in a
mock scenario.
These efforts were overseen by personnel from Endgame
Product, UX, and R&D groups and carried out internally
and externally. A combination of mock scenarios and user
interviews were conducted with users at every level of a se-
curity team. The teams selected for observation were care-
fully chosen to represent the wide array of blue teams found
in a typical SOC environment. Questions and scenarios
were modified to reflect the diversity of the teams, verticals,
and sectors they represented. From data collection meth-
ods used, a set of four users archetypes were identified and
their roles and responsibilities helped shape the design of
Artemis. The teams selected were as followed:
2.0.1 Traditional SOC
The Traditional SOC was a veteran security team that is
still currently employed in the commercial space. The par-
ticipants from this team included four highly trained SOC
professionals, two moderately trained SOC analysts, and one
manager overseeing the team’s operation. They were fa-
miliar with a multitude of security analysis tools, including
Endgame’s platform.
2.0.2 Novice Training Team
The Novice Training Team was a hand-picked, relatively in-
experienced security team, which currently operates in the
federal space. The participants from this team included ten
new SOC professionals, and two highly trained SOC leaders.
While the two experienced analysts were familiar with many
security analysis tools, the other ten participants had a base
familiarity with two tools, one of which was the Endgame
Platform.
2.0.3 Red v. Blue (internal)
The Red v. Blue (internal) was a mixed group of secu-
rity professionals, with backgrounds mostly from the federal
space. The participants from this group were split into two
teams. The blue team consisted of four highly trained se-
curity professionals, two moderately trained analysts, and
two inexperienced analysts. The red team consisted of three
extremely proficient security professionals. Participants had
a mixed range of knowledge on the Endgame platform, as
well as other security analysis tools.
2.0.4 Traditional SOC & Security Consultants
The Traditional SOC & Security Consultants was an ever-
rotating cast of different security professional types seen
from both the federal and commercial space. The partic-
ipants included a wide array of security analysts and were
typically interviewed in teams of one or two on one-week in-
tervals. There was usually little knowledge of the Endgame
Platform, but participants were well versed in other security
analysis tools.
2.1 Data Collection
We sought to employ a variety of collection methods on the
diverse set of user groups during the discovery process. (Ta-
ble 1) Most participating individuals were interviewed in
one-on-one settings against a set similar questions. Inter-
views consisted of 12 predefined questions based upon team
environment and 4 questions dependent on the user’s role
within a security organization. These questions sought to
elicit user views on the current state of the UI, viability
of the contextual information provided on alert views, and
recommended capabilities, functionality, and data sources.
Additional insight was gained during operational multi-day
exercises where UX, product, and research personnel were
embedded as monitors and captured workflows and user be-
havior in a simulated environment.
Other collection methods involved multi-hour retrospectives
where teams, consisting of managers and analysts (experi-
enced and junior), were given the opportunity to respond
to questions about the platform, their workflows, and the
opportunity to provide user feedback. Finally, user testing
with guerrilla methods was situationally employed during
the multi-day operational exercises and a long-term testing
phase with a mid-sized security team. Guerrilla usability
testing allows researchers to rapidly assess user opinion on
a feature, but having the user provide thoughts while ac-
tively using the product “in the wild.”[12] The results are
not quantitative, but rather qualitative, uncovered through
conversation. Guerrilla methods allowed us to gain quick
feedback on incremental changes about the product by ap-
proach various members of security teams. Guerrilla meth-
ods require a limited time commitment and does not impede
with security workers day-to-day responsibilities. Moreover,
this methodology adequately captured changes in opinion
on core features of our platform over an extended testing
period.
The Traditional SOC Team The Traditional SOC Team
was interviewed in two distinct sessions. First, the group
participated in a four hour informal retrospective where mem-
bers first identified their roles and were given the opportu-
nity to ask questions and provide feedback with a loosely
set agenda. The Team was then split into individual formal
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Table 1: Breakdown of Security Team Data Collection.
Group Team Type Discovery Environment Collection Method
A Traditional SOC Day-to-Day Use User Interviews
B Novice Training Team Mock Scenario
Side-by-side monitoring,
Retrospective &
User Interviews
w/ guerrilla methods
C Red v. Blue (internal) Mock Scenario
Side-by-side monitoring,
Retrospective &
User Interviews
w/ guerrilla methods
D Traditional SOC & Security Consultants Day-to-Day Use User Testing w/ guerrilla methods
sessions where they were presented with the 16 predefined
questions. Finding were discussed internally and broken out
into a mental model. All interviews were recorded, and tran-
scribed.
Novice Training Team and Red vs. Blue Since both
the Novice Training Team and the Red vs. Blue (internal)
Team matched in general size, background space, and field
experience, they each participated in the same multi-day op-
erational exercise. Participants formed a 10-12 person blue
team, where they were given the operational task to search
out red team attackers and remediate their mock environ-
ment. Our red team consisted of highly trained security pro-
fessionals who were tasked to invade the mock environment.
Both exercises were intensely monitored and throughout the
mock scenario UX personnel engaged all members of the blue
team in quick 15 minute one-on-one guerilla testing. At the
end of the exercise both groups engaged in a 1 to 2 hour
retrospective. Field notes were taken throughout the en-
tire exercise. Traditional SOC & Security Consultants
The Traditional SOC & Security Consultants Team was en-
gaged over the course of several months in quick guerilla
testing sessions. UX and Product personnel approached 1 to
2 members of the team to ask questions around the product,
observe them perform specific tasks while using the product,
and asked about their experience. These sessions lasted 30
minutes, were weekly to biweekly and were recorded using
field notes.
Overall, our collection methodology provided a rich data
source to generate standard security team workforce roles
and set requirements to begin the design of our conversa-
tional agent.
2.2 Workforce Roles
Upon completion of the of the discovery phase, we were able
to aggregate collected data to clearly define four prominent
roles in most security organizations: SOC Manager, Tier 1,
Tier 3, and Incident Responder.
2.2.1 SOC Manager
SOC Managers are often skilled security practitioners, but
are not necessarily subject matter experts. They have ex-
tensive management experience and oversee day-to-day team
operations. This role leverages ticketing and workflow tools,
such as SIEM dashboards, to generate automated reports.
They are responsible for assigning and prioritizing investi-
gation and triage efforts. They manage and author security
playbooks, create analyst development plans, and brief C-
level executive teams on the current state of the network.
2.2.2 Incident Responder
An incident responder or forensic investigator is a secu-
rity expert specializing in endpoint discovery platforms and
sophisticated investigation tools. Most comfortable with
command lines and scripting languages, an incident respon-
der often bypasses the Graphical User Interface (GUI) alto-
gether to use third-party APIs which allows for rapid data
collection to determine the origin and extent of a possible
breach. Although tasked with preparing response plans for
incidents, incident responders typically do not have the au-
thority to respond with a decision from the network owner.
2.2.3 Tier 3 Analyst
Tier 3 analysts are expected to intimately understand net-
work and platform architecture, investigate escalated alerts,
determine root causes, and remediate problems. They are
depended on as domain experts within the security team and
are more comfortable working through the command line.
They prefer a wealth of data being pulled back through an
endpoint platform as they know exactly what they should be
looking for and what steps are needed to prepare a plan of
action. They are often critical of endpoint platforms’ GUI,
which they view as restricting them from quickly carrying
out tasks and workflows during an investigation.
2.2.4 Tier 1 Analyst
Tier 1 analysts have limited prior experience (approx. 1
year) in the information security space. Professional experi-
ence is gained through professional training, often a 1-2 week
course, and through on-the-job training. A typical Tier 1
will have a basic understanding of their organization’s net-
work and the security platform they employ.
Their primary role is the first line of defense on a security
team, responsible for triaging alerts and determining if es-
calation (passing to higher tiered analyst) is required. An
exorbitant amount of data, which is often not relevant to
determine severity of an alert, frustrates these users as they
look for a select amount of data to determine escalation.
These users primarily rely on a platform’s GUI. Adding new
syntax from the information security space or the organiza-
tion’s platform further complicates this user’s understanding
of what warrants escalation. Additional responsibilities for
Tier 1 include monitoring, review, and escalation of new
alerts on the platform.
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2.3 Findings
Throughout the data collection process we discovered com-
monalities across the teams interviewed. While security
workforce roles provided valuable insight, it was the descrip-
tions of analyst day-to-day workflow that proved most use-
ful.
Contextual Information (Tier 1): Many analysts described
a lack of understanding of how best to interact with various
features within the security platform. Sample feedback in-
cluded:
• What data returns from a persistence hunt?
• What does this alert type mean?
• How do I whitelist an alert?
• Now that I created an investigation, where am I going?
Generally speaking, this takeaway leads to unnatural or bad
habits. Because users don’t know what features do, or why
they can’t easily perform some task - they go through a
grueling process of repeatedly accomplishing the same task
in many, many steps.
Pivoting (Tier 1/Tier 3): Another common theme among
analysts was pivoting throughout the platform. This ob-
servation was closely tied to context,. Most users wanted
an easier way to go from an alert or data point back into
a data store to extract supplemental or complementary in-
formation. This step is critical for analysts to develop a
fully formed hypothesis about an event. A natural, intuitive
workflow for pivoting within the platform simply did not
exist. Because of this, the user often opened multiple tabs
to access core functionality and data, and yield supporting
facts necessary to remediate an alert.
2.3.1 Day in Life
When a SOC analyst starts their shift, they first participate
in the shift handover from the analysts on the previous shift.
Here they get a briefing on current ongoing investigations or
open alerts, ticket numbers associated with those alerts, who
is assigned to the investigations, and anything that needs
attention.
They then monitor a SIEM, an assigned endpoint UI dash-
board, or email and wait for a security event to occur. Typ-
ically that doesn’t take very long - with the amount of tools
generating alerts in a typical SOC environment (especially
those monitoring large networks) - getting alerts is not the
problem. Determining which alerts to focus on is the prob-
lem. The analyst is typically in reactive mode - where they
respond to alerts as they come in, quickly identifying the
high priority alerts.
Typically, Tier 1 Analysts will have little to no authority
to take immediate action on suspected malicious security
events and will instead move the alert up the SOC chain.
When escalating they will create a case/investigation/incident
and assign that case/investigation/incident to the SOC in-
vestigator (or Tier 3 analysis). Both the SOC Investigator
and the Tier 3 Analyst will take further steps in verifying
the anomalous event, and will take the proper response in
remediating the alert. While the Tier 3 Analyst will also sift
through a SIEM alongside the Tier 1 Analyst, SOC Investi-
gators will often times only work on escalated alerts.
Table 2: The Breakdown of Time Spent on a Specific
Task.
Task % Time Spent
Shift Handover 12.5
Report Writing 12.5
Incident Creation 25
Alert Triage 50
At the end of the shift, all levels of analysts needs to pre-
pare a report of the alerts triaged, what was resolved, and
what is still open in order to handover the activities to the
oncoming shift. Larger reports depicting alert and investi-
gation trends are generated for a SOC Manager on a daily
or weekly basis. The SOC Manager will use these reports
to focus in on key metadata in the coming weeks, determine
the SOC shift schedule and build a custom summary report
for the organization’s executive level. (Table 2)
2.3.2 Design Requirements
On top of defining security team work roles, we leveraged
collected data to develop a set of design requirements that
sought to meet the demands of and eliminate common frus-
trations across security workers. At its core, we needed a
solution to become the interface to network endpoint data,
providing an ability to generate natural language queries,
and perform complex workflows. At a minimum, the solu-
tion must:
1. Eliminate query syntax via natural language
2. Educate users on platform features
3. Provide context-driven alert triage
4. Recommend next steps
5. Expedite focused collection
These requirements and additional functionality resulted in
Artemis, a conversational interface, described in the follow-
ing sections.
3. ARTEMIS
A conversational assistant met the demands of multiple users
and use cases. Artemis was our name for the suite of tech-
nologies that presents a chat interface to the user. (figure
1) It is more than just a bot, but rather enabled multiple
advances in user experience and functionality. We combined
UX research and data science to create a user-centric design
to ease users’ pain points as described below.
3.1 Conversation-driven Queries
To oversimplify Artemis, a user asks a question and Artemis
returns the answer. The more detailed view is that the
user crafts a natural language query across endpoints and
Artemis sends that query to those endpoints and then for-
mats the data returned. The goal was to allow users to move
away from syntax driven queries (such as SQL or Lucene
query syntax) and more towards semantically driven queries.
In other words, the ideal interaction would never require
the user to translate what they mean from English into the
syntax of the computer. Understanding the entirety of the
written word requires contextual information, but limiting
the understood vocabulary to the information security world
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Figure 1: Primary pane of Artemis Chat Interface
allows for quicker understanding. The bot doesn’t need to
disambiguate between process as an abstract concept and
process as a running program on a computer, since it is al-
ways the latter.
Parsing natural language sentences to guide less experienced
tier 1 users through their initial interactions can speed up
their workflow. For Tier 3, though, we can’t let the ease
of use become a hindrance to their speed of interaction.
User feedback showed that typing full sentences could get
tiresome search after search. The bot luckily has no pro-
grammed requirement that the users communicate in full
sentences. Once the intent is given, the rest of the parame-
ters can be added in with very little extraneous verbiage.
Figure 2: NLU Pipeline on a sample Artemis query
3.1.1 Language Understanding
Supporting communication with the end user may seem mag-
ical at first, but the code behind it performs two basic func-
tions which are enabled by recent advancements in open
natural language understanding (NLU) research. The user’s
utterance, or text input, is passed into an entity extractor,
which categorizes the words and phrases into entities. In
NLU this tagging process is known as Named Entity Recog-
nition (NER). We then replace the entities with a generic
name through a process we call redaction. This allows the
next step of intent classification to model a reduced vocab-
ulary.
The second and final step in the text processing pipeline is
classifying the intent of the user’s utterance. (figure 2) The
intent corresponds roughly to what the user wants to do and
the entities correspond to what the user wants to do it with.
The intent classifier works by analyzing the entire redacted
sentence and comparing the features to models trained on a
set of manually classified sentences.
3.1.2 Fill in Missing Information
The two stage language understanding pipeline described
works for most cases, but the models can fail to classify
certain utterances or entities. We try to avoid this type of
classification error through robust training sets and rigorous
testing. Admittedly the engine can do very little if it fails
to recognize any intent or entity whatsoever. In our testing,
if the user doesn’t enter a recognizable intent we can learn
from this data to improve our models. In deployed usage,
though, the user still wants to achieve their goal regardless of
Artemis’ understanding. If the user phrases something such
that our intent classification fails, we offer helpful dialog to
guide the user and elicit intent.
A more common missing information situation is when an
intent has been classified but the user hasn’t filled in all of
the entities needed to run the task. The tasks available to
the user have schemas which dictate the required and op-
tional parameters, and correspond to different entity types.
Selecting and asking for the remaining entities for a given in-
tent is as simple as comparing the set of given entities to the
set of needed/optional entities and asking for the difference
in a generated sentence.
3.1.3 Misunderstanding and Disambiguation
Other than intent classification failure and entity extraction
failure, the most pernicious problem is misunderstanding.
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Classifying the intent as the wrong intent is arguably worse
than classifying it as no intent. For example if a user wrote
“search for a process” and got into the “kill process” intent,
the results could be very damaging. We avoid this by limit-
ing the words that we train with for more dangerous tasks,
lowering the likelihood of misclassification. This additional
safeguard against dangerous tasks, unit testing, and quality
assurance, plus our confirmation step, protect users from
this possibility.
The more likely situation is that the entities are extracted
improperly. For example, filenames are limited in charac-
ters, but still have so many possible combinations that many
domain names, IP addresses, hashes, and usernames are ac-
tually valid filenames as well. How can a user or a com-
puter know if “command.com” refers to a filename or a web-
site? Without context that differentiation is impossible and
it wouldn’t help the user to guess. In this case of multiple
valid slots open in the intent for multiple possible entity ex-
tractions, we must disambiguate with the user. This slows
workflow, so we support hinting or tagging the words such
that “file command.com” would definitively be extracted as
a file name.
3.2 Precision Search
In 2008 the MapReduce paper [13] showed that processing
big data could be done efficiently by distributing the compu-
tation to the computers that held the right shards of data. In
information security, data from endpoints is often retrieved
to a central location and processed. In fact, the data is
sometimes taken from a set of endpoints, then stored in a
cluster for centralized processing. In our work with Artemis,
we wanted to leverage the computing power of the endpoints
in a similar way to MapReduce. We treat the endpoints as
the worker nodes, responsible for their own data, then map
a function across the endpoints to collect the relevant data
for the user. That way only the relevant data goes across
the wire, limiting after the fact data sifting.
3.3 Context-Aware Dialog
Artemis’ ability to infer meaning is imperative to the work-
flow.
Conversation with a Participant during training:
“It’s great you have all this information here. But here, ok.
Look at this PID (they are pointing to a random PID in a
process hunt on the endpoint page). What can i exactly do
with this? Can I run a process survey on this? Can I search
on this to get relevant information to this survey? What are
the hunts I can do with this? I want to have a way I can do
this from here, without spending the time searching around..
building information around this PID.”
To reduce the amount of clicks and eliminate the need to per-
form copy/paste operations on long, complex search strings
(i.e. file hashes or registry keys), Artemis is able to leverage
the data currently in view to allow the user to express query
terms generically. For example, if a user is currently view-
ing a malware alert, which provides information such as a
file hash and name, they do not need to copy or type that
metadata into Artemis. Instead, the user may express their
search more generally using an utterance like “does this hash
show up anywhere else in my network?” or “search process
data for this hash”. This functionality should aid in giving
experienced and inexperienced users more time in the chat
Figure 3: (top) Red coloring highlights enriched
record; (bottom) visual indicator shows user the
starting point of a process lineage task
window and executing workflows, and less time clicking to
perform copy/paste operations.
3.4 Card-based Results View
The successful completion of a natural language query launches
an investigation to endpoint machines. The results of that
action are presented in a card-based view for quick digestion.
Cards are ideal for communicating quick stories about each
returned results. Each card summarizes essential data, in-
cluding information about the query, as well as supplemental
metadata that can be used to pivot to the next operation.
The cards employ color-coding and iconography to high-
light cards that may require immediate attention. (figure 3)
These cards have been tagged by an enrichment pipeline all
returned data passes through to determine if query responses
contain any anomalous information (e.g. high likelihood of
malware).
4. RESULTS
Our goal was to capture the challenges facing security teams
and understand ideal day-to-day workflows for experienced
and inexperienced security workers. The initial implemen-
tation of Artemis is a byproduct of those findings.
After integrating Artemis into the Endgame platform we
conducted follow up interviews and user testing. User stated
they spent a minimal amount of time understanding how
best to interact with the tool. Tier 1 analysts highlighted
the utility in turn-based conversations to construct complex
queries and build investigations. Several Tier 3 analysts
stated they were skeptical of a “chat” interface, but after
extended use began to treat it as a command line to launch
investigations and perform queries across network. Tier 3
and incident responders maintained that for mass ingest of
data (e.g. searching 100s of file hashes from threat intel
feeds) they would prefer to script against our API. Both
sets of users stated they would continue to use the tool and
recommended additional capabilities to improve day-to-day
workflows.
We monitored security worker teams in small scenario-based
simulations that required use of Artemis to better capture
how workers interacted with the tool. We present the fol-
lowing categories that capture the introduction of Artemis
into their workflow.
4.1 Create Efficient Alternative Interactions
Offering alternative interactions with data tailored to user
needs can improve interaction efficiency for a variety of users.
Our platform is built around a GUI for displaying and in-
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teracting with security information provided by sensors de-
ployed on endpoints. While this is immediately usable by
most information security professionals, those used to the
command line may find it too point and click intensive. Key-
board shortcuts may sometimes make users more efficient,
they can be too hard to recall [14, 15]. With a conversational
interface we are able to reduce the memory requirements of
keyboard shortcuts by allowing multiple paths to success,
while ideally reducing the search and click latency of mouse
driven interfaces. The ability of Artemis to chat with the
user removes some of the pain of a command line interface,
where an incomplete command fails silently, our bot will ask
for the information necessary to complete a task.
4.2 Reduce Focus Shifts
Flipping back and forth between web pages, tabs, modals,
can be tiresome for a user, especially as the data changes
within the components. Some observations from our user
interviews explain the focus difficulties faced.
An analyst would have 3 tabs open at all times. When no-
ticed, the room was quickly surveyed to see who was working
in a similar way. On average, 2-3 tabs were opened on ev-
eryone’s computer to manage the data and ease workflow.
Witnessed Ex 1: If a user was interested in a subset of
returns of an investigation and wanted to task those end-
points:
1. The Investigation Detail page was opened to view the
endpoints in question.
2. The Endpoint List page was opened to filter through
the data to select those particular endpoints.
Witnessed Ex 2: When a user wanted to compile simi-
lar alerts (within different endpoints) and link them to an
investigation, they had to:
1. Keep one tab open to cycle through alerts to copy/paste
endpoint names in a table (MS Excel).
2. Have the endpoint table open to then filter those re-
sults to find the endpoints, to task the alerts in ques-
tion.
With a chat pinned to the window the user can see the data
retrieved from their chat and ask further relevant questions.
This reduction in focus shift allows users to avoid context
switching penalty while maintaining their analytic flow.
4.3 Personal Expression to Canonical Search
Each user or team may have a different vocabulary describ-
ing the world of infosec. A conversational interface should al-
low for synonymous language to be used without concern for
proper keywords and syntax. We call the words and phrases
in a user’s vocabulary, mainly nouns, entities, a term taken
from NLP research. The conversational interface classifies
such entities in an utterance into a known canonical set. For
example, users are free to express themselves in such a way
that if they like to call machines“boxes”or boxes“machines”
or “computers” the bot can classify them all as “endpoints.”
This classification allows the bot to enact a version of the Ro-
bustness Principle (Postel’s Law), “Be conservative in what
you send, be liberal in what you accept”. This allows for a
shared canonical language to be used for saved searches and
within the product, without limiting users to our chosen ter-
minology or forcing them to recall the exact phrasing they
need to use.
5. FUTURE WORK
The current implementation addresses major challenges an-
alysts face in search and discovery tasks, provides a platform
to implement workflows, and presents an interface that can
educate inexperienced users. Remaining challenges lie in the
platform’s ability to provide simple, intuitive collaboration
to users and better natural language understanding.
5.1 Collaboration
The current implementation addresses major challenges to
analysts face in search and discovery tasks, provides a plat-
form to implement workflows, and presents an interface that
can educate inexperienced users. Remaining challenges lie
in the platform’s ability to provide simple, intuitive collab-
oration to users. Users have expressed the desire to share
investigations with other members of the team.
Conversation with a Participant during training:
“Ok, I’ve been assigned this set of alerts.. but why? What
should I be looking for? Does the person assigning me this
have insight to where I should start my hunting? How do I
even notify that user that this task has been completed once
I have resolved the issue?”
Our proposed approach focuses on allowing the users to “at”
(e.g. like @ on Twitter) each other or all members of team
with a completed investigation. Recipients of these “@s” will
see a broadcast message appear in their chat window alert-
ing them to check the investigation page for a newly shared
event. The first tier of collaboration should satisfy most re-
quirements in the near-term and provide a foundation for
actual chat integration.
5.2 Chat Integration
While our platform is usable through a point and click inter-
face, our power users can already integrate their own tooling
with our exposed APIs. The API of Artemis is also exposed
to our users under authentication. This allows for experi-
mental integration with other chat platforms and modalities,
such as Slack, HipChat and Jabber to Alexa and Cortana.
We have yet to create these integrations ourselves, although
we are happy to open it up to our users.
5.3 Improve via Active Learning
Active learning presents the end user an opportunity to eval-
uate how well the natural language pipeline performed in
understanding an input. UX considerations will be neces-
sary to determine the most advantageous approach to collect
this data with possible options including: 1) Artemis asking
the user how well it did; 2) Providing a clickable “thumbs
up/down” indicator; or 3) Upon completion of a task asking
the user to grade performance on a 1-10 scale. Collected
feedback will be applied in a semi-supervised learning algo-
rithm to augment future classification models.
6. CONCLUSION
As the need for highly skilled security workers continues to
rise, it is imperative to provide capabilities designed to aug-
ment, not hinder, the development of current and future
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analysts. Through the collaborative effort of UX, data sci-
ence, and domain experts, security tools can be developed
to support the diverse user base they serve. Artemis and
conversational interfaces in general offer one possible solu-
tion to creating an accessible interface for new users while
simultaneously offering faster, more complex interactions for
experienced users.
Technology built upon user-centered design can augment the
current workforce and reduce the barrier of entry for future
security workers. Similar to our user-focused research in de-
veloping Artemis, the security industry needs to integrate
data automation within user-friendly interfaces that meet
the workflows of analysts tasked with defending against the
growing range of attacks. Not only does this augment the
current workforce, but it also will make security more acces-
sible to a broader workforce in the coming years.
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